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Abstract 
A safety system is an essential part of any industrial system as it operates to prevent the 
occurrence of certain conditions and their future development into a hazardous situation. Failure 
of such systems may have catastrophic consequences from small injuries to even death of 
members of  the workforce and public, therefore, it is imperative to minimize safety system 
unavailability and also find the balance between its unavailability and other limitations on its 
operation, for example, life cycle cost and spurious trip frequency. Hence, a multi-objective 
optimization of the system design is required. This paper describes a design optimization scheme 
using multi-objective genetic algorithms (MOGAs) applied to a firewater deluge system (FDS) 
on an offshore platform, which works to supply on demand water and foam at a controlled 
pressure to a specific area on the platform, protected by the deluge system.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
The system design can be chosen by traditional approaches, which combine the preliminary 
design, analysis, appraisal and redesign stages until what is regarded as an acceptable design is 
achieved. To find an optimal design a process is required which considers a number of design 
variables. Genetic algorithms (GAs) are a group of techniques which allow this type of parallel 
processing [1]. Previously the firewater deluge system unavailability has been optimized by the 
 2 
simple genetic algorithm [2]. However, it is not the only important criterion of the large safety 
system (for example, system cost, spurious trip frequency) and, hence, multi-objective system 
optimization should be utilized.  There are a number of different techniques that can be used to 
carry out such optimization problems, for example, simulated annealing, tabu search, and genetic 
algorithms.  A comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of these techniques is given in 
references [3, 4].  The Improved Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm (SPEA2) is chosen to 
perform the FDS optimization [5]. This is a relatively recent and effective multi-objective 
genetic algorithm (MOGA) technique, which incorporates a fine-grained fitness assignment 
strategy, a density estimation technique and an enhanced archive truncation method.  
During the last few years SPEA2 has been successfully applied to safety system optimum 
design. In 2003 Greiner [6] applied different multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (SPEA2, 
NSGSII and controlled elitist-NSGAII) to a Containment Spray Injection System of a nuclear 
power plant.  In 2004 Hiroyasu [7] optimized  heavy-duty diesel engines by a hybrid of SPEA2 
and NSGAII techniques.  In 2007 Martorell [8] applied SPEA2 based MOGA to the high 
pressure injection system (HPIS) of a nuclear power plant optimization. The optimization criteria 
involved system unavailability and cost. In 2007 Aribia [9] found optimal reactive dispatch in 
terms of three objectives (compensational device cost, transmission losses and the voltage 
deviation) by SPEA2 based optimization tool.  
Analysis of individual system designs of the FDS are carried out using the fault tree 
method [10] and the binary decision diagram approach [11]. The optimization criteria involves 
system unavailability, cost and spurious trip frequency. Comparison of the results produced by 
the implemented SPEA2 technique to those obtained by using the simple genetic algorithm is 
carried out, yielding results, that indicate that the technique is suitable for application in this 
industrial domain.  
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2 OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUE 
The developed optimization technique combines the advantages of fault tree analysis (FT) for 
system failure logic representation, binary decision diagrams (BDD) for system design 
quantification and the Improved Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm (SPEA2) for system 
design optimization. The main features of FT and BDD techniques are discussed briefly in 
section 2.1. Section 2.2 describes the SPEA2 method. 
 
2.1 FT Analysis and BDD 
Fault tree analysis is a deductive (top-down) technique, structured in terms of events rather than 
components [10]. It acts as a visual tool, a graphical representation of the various parallel and 
sequential combinations of faults that lead to the occurrence of the top event. Hence, the fault 
tree have been chosen to represent the safety system failure logic.  
The FT can be constructed for each potential system design, however it is an impractical 
task when there are a large number of design options. This problem can be solved by including  
house events in the FT structure. House events are used to model two state events which either 
occur or do not occur, and, therefore, have probabilities 1 or 0. They provide a very effective 
means of turning sections of the fault tree on and off. One of the advantages of this is that the 
same fault tree can be used to model several scenarios.  
The system unavailability and spurious trip frequency can be calculated directly from the 
FT for each potential design. However, often real safety systems require a large FT due to the 
number of components. In such cases analysis of the top event probability usually requires the 
use of approximations, since the exact technique makes significant use of computer recourses. 
For these situations the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) approach is potentially the most 
successful [11]. It has been decided to use the BDD technique, since the method improves both 
the efficiency of determining the minimal cut sets of the fault tree and also the accuracy of the 
calculation procedure used to determine the top event parameters. 
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2.2 SPEA2 Algorithm 
The developed optimization tool incorporates the SPEA2 method, designed by Zitzler, 
Laumanns and Thiele [5]. It is an improved version of the strength Pareto evolutionary algorithm 
(SPEA), developed by Zitzler and Thiele in 1998 [12]. SPEA2 is a relatively recent evolutionary 
technique for finding or approximating the optimal solution set for multiobjective optimization 
problems. It has shown very good performance in comparison to other multiobjective genetic 
algorithms [5].  The suggested  algorithm can be explained in six steps: 
  Step 1. Initialization: Generate an initial population of potential designs and create the 
empty archive called external set. The resultant archive after the optimization is complete will 
hold the set of best designs. 
Step 2. Fitness assignment: Calculate fitness value of each potential design in the initial 
population. This fitness value represents the suitability of the design given by the optimization 
criteria. 
Step 3. Environmental selection: Copy all nondominated designs to the archive (given the 
optimization is a minimization problem, the nondominated solutions are those, which have at 
least one smallest optimization parameter value). If the archive is exceeded reduce it by means of 
the truncation operator, otherwise fill the archive with dominated designs from the initial 
population. The number of designs contained in the archive is to remain constant over time. 
Step 4. Termination: If the maximum number of generations is reached or another 
stopping criterion is satisfied then the set of possible designs are those in the archive. Algorithm 
complete. Else continue to step 5. 
Step 5. Mating selection: Perform binary tournament selection with replacement on the 
archive in order to fill the mating pool (group of designs upon which genetic modification may 
occur), i.e.: 
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a) Randomly (using uniformly distributed random numbers) select two 
individuals out of the archive. 
b) Copy the one with the better (i.e. lower for the FDS optimization problem) 
fitness value to the mating pool. 
c) If the mating pool is full, then stop, else go to step (a). 
 
Step 6. Variation: Apply recombination and mutation operators to the mating pool and 
set the archive to the resulting population (recombination is a process in which individual strings 
are copied according to their fitness values, and mutation is an operation that provides a random 
element in the search process).  Increment generation counter and go to Step 2. 
 
3 FDS SYSTEM 
The system whose design is to be investigated is a  Firewater Deluge System (FDS), which is an 
essential part of an offshore platform and supplies, on demand, water and foam at a controlled 
pressure to a specific area, protected by a deluge system [2]. The main features of the deluge 
system are shown in figure 1. The FDS comprises a deluge skid, firewater pumps, with 
associated equipment and ringmains, and aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) pumps, with 
associated equipment and ringmains. The description of the main parts of the FDS is provided in 
section 3.1. Section 3.2 represents the system design variables. The FDS failure events and data 
are discussed in section 3.3.  
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Fig. 1  Firewater deluge system 
 
3.1 Main Parts of the FDS 
There are three main parts of the FDS system: 
The Deluge System:  The deluge valve set with all associated equipment is mounted on a 
fabricated steel framework called a skid. Skids are situated on the processing platform where an 
incident can occur. In this situation the associated equipment acts to spray water onto the 
affected area. The three main elements of the deluge valve set are the main distribution line, a 
water closing circuit and a control air circuit.  
The system can be operated either manually by opening the systems local manual release 
valve on the skid  or automatically: the main fire and gas panel (MFGP) gives the signal to the 
solenoid valves to de-energize and open thus releasing air pressure from the control air circuit. 
After the pressure drop the valmatic release valve opens and the water from the water closing 
circuit runs to drain. This process results in the fall of pressure on the deluge valve diaphragm. 
When the pressure on the diaphragm has fallen sufficiently, the firewater main pressure, acting 
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on the underside of the deluge valve clack, overcomes the load imposed by the diaphragm. This 
allows water to flow into the distribution pipes, through the nozzle and onto the hazard. 
The deluge valve set is also fitted with an aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) supply 
line. Instrument air pressure maintains the valmatic release valve and AFFF valve closed. The 
AFFF valve and valmatic release valve open simultaneously when the air pressure drops in the 
control air circuit. This reaction is caused by the de-energising of the solenoid valves. As the 
water flows through the foam inductor in the main distribution line, foam concentrate is induced 
from the AFFF line via the foam proportioner. As a result, the solution of water and 
approximately 3% foam then feed into the distribution network, through the nozzles and onto the 
hazard. 
Firewater Supply and Distribution System: The deluge systems are connected to a 
pressurised ringmain network. The jockey pump maintains the ringmain pressure by drawing 
water from the sea. The pressure transducers detect the falling pressure and subsequently send 
the signal to the MFGP, which activates the firewater pumps to supply water direct from the sea 
at sufficient pressure to meet the deluge requirement. In inactive standby the pumps remain not 
needed. Both pumps can be started manually at the fire control panel. There are two sets of fire 
pumps: one set is powered from the main electric power plant and the other from their own 
dedicated diesel engines. The diesels have a day tank, which provides a 24 hour supply. The tank 
is fitted with a low level alarm, giving a signal in the central control room. 
AFF Supply and Distribution System: The foam concentrate is stored in a stainless 
steel tank and is distributed through a stainless steel ringmain network. Similar to the firewater 
supply and distribution system, the tank has a low level alarm fitted, sounding in the central 
control room. The foam system is kept at approximately the same pressure as the firewater 
system by a continuously running air driven jockey pump. There are two types of AFFF pumps: 
one supplied from the platform power plant, the other are diesel driven. When any firewater 
pump starts to supply foam at sufficient pressure to meet design requirements, the AFFF pumps 
 8 
start automatically. It should be noted that the pumps not needed remain in standby. The diesel 
supply to the firewater diesel pumps is separate from that of the AFFF diesel pumps. 
 
3.2 FDS Design Variables 
The firewater deluge system is a relatively complicated system. Therefore, there are a huge 
number of design options which can be considered. The overall FDS system can be represented 
by the following 17 design variables with range specified in brackets: 
• N – number of pressure transmitters on the ringmain (1, 2, 3, 4), 
• K – number of pressure transmitters required to trip (1 - N), 
• P – pressure transmitter type (1, 2, 3), 
• FE – number of electrically powered firewater pumps (0-4), 
• FD – number of diesel firewater pumps (0-4); 
• FP – the percentage capacity of the firewater pumps (100%, 50% or 33.33%), 
• FT – the pump type for 50% and 33.33% capacity pumps (1 or 2), 
• AE – number of the electrically powered AFFF pumps (0-2), 
• AD – Number of diesel AFFF pumps (0-2),  
• AP – the percentage of the capacity for the AFFF pumps (100% or 50%), 
• W – water deluge valve type (1, 2 or 3), 
• D – AFFF deluge valve type (1, 2 or 3), 
• C – type of the materials for certain purpose (new or old), 
• θP – maintenance test interval for the firewater and AFFF pump system (1-28 days), 
• θR  – maintenance test interval for the ringmain (1 to 24 weeks), 
• θD – maintenance test interval for the deluge skid (3-18 months in 3 monthly interval  
              only), 
• θPM – preventative maintenance on components of wear-out type (3-18 months in 3  
               monthly intervals only). 
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It is important to notice that similar to the AFFF system pumps all pumps in the firewater 
system are to be of the same capacity. In addition, electric and diesel pumps of 100% capacity in 
the firewater system are of  one type only, as are both 100% and 50% pumps in the AFFF 
system. 
  
3.3 Failure Data 
There are two main types of the FDS events. The type ‘HE’ states that the event is a human 
error. On the other hand, type ‘CO’ denotes that the event is a component failure. The ‘wear-out’ 
components are denoted by ‘W’. In contrast, ‘NW’ states that the component is of ‘non-wear-
out’ type. It is important to notice, that preventative maintenance is only carried out on 
components of wear-out type.  
The system is checked for corrosion build-up. Consequently, corrosion resistant 
components are introduced, where ‘n’ and ‘o’ correspond to the non-corrosion resistant and 
corrosion resistant materials respectively.  
Tables 1 – 3 show the subsets of the failure events and data for the deluge system, 
firewater supply and AFFF supply  distribution systems respectively.  
 
 
Table 1 Subset of failure events for deluge system  
Event 
Name 
Event Description Event 
Type 
Rates 
WBN 
(new) 
Deluge nozzle on the water spray system blocked, new type 
material. 
CO NW 
WV1 Water deluge valve type 1 fails to open CO NW 
MRM Manual release mechanism fails to dump instrument air. CO NW 
AIVC Operator leaves the normally locked open butterfly valve on the 
AFFF distribution line in the shut position. 
HE - 
AV1 AFFF deluge valve type 1 fails to open on demand CO NW 
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Table 2 Subset of failure events for firewater supply and distribution system 
Event 
Name 
Description Event 
Type 
Rates 
ESF Failure of electricity supply to electric driven firewater pumps. CO NW 
DIVB Diesel engine supply is blocked. CO NW 
DIVC Diesel supply is inadvertently left isolated after maintenance. HE - 
E_100 Failure of electric pump with 100% capacity. CO W 
E1_50 Failure of electric pump type 1 with 50% capacity. CO W 
 
It is important to notice, that the electricity supply (ESF) is global to all electric pumps. 
In addition, a single diesel tank supplies all fitted firewater diesel pumps.  
 
Table 3 Subset of failure events for AFFF supply and distribution system 
Event 
Name 
Description Event 
Type 
Rates 
ATIVB Normally locked open ball valve on AFFF tank outlet blocked. CO NW 
ATIVC AFFF supply left isolated after maintenance. HE - 
AE_100 Failure of AFFF electric pump with 100% capacity. CO W 
AD_100 Failure of AFFF diesel pump with 100% capacity. CO W 
 
Failure and repair data, maintenance effort and costs are provided for all components. 
The human error events only require specification of the probability of occurrence.  
The unavailability, Q(t), for the majority of FDS components is calculated by using the 
standard scheduled maintenance formula (i.e., 





+τ
θλ
2
). However, the pumps are of wear-out 
type, therefore, the Weibull distribution is used. This distribution is chosen because in contrast to 
the exponential distribution Weibull is able to model increasing and decreasing failure rates. 
Thus, lending itself to the first (wear-in) and last (wear-out) phases of the bathtub curve in 
addition to the useful life period.  It is characterised by a hazard rate function of the form given 
in equation 1, 
0  ,0  ,0  ,)(
1
≥>>





=
−
t
t
t βη
ηη
βλ
β
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where β is referred to as the shape parameter and η is the scale parameter (or characteristic life), 
which influences both the mean and spread of the distribution. Modifying the value of β has a 
dramatic effect on the probability density function )(tf  (Equation 2): 
 














−=
β
η
λ tttf exp)()( .                                                                                                 (2) 
 
When β < 1, the hazard rate applies to the burn-in phase. On the other hand, for β  = 1 the  
hazard  rate  is  constant  and  the distribution is identical to the exponential. When β > 1, the 
hazard rate applies to the wear-out phase. For β  ≥ 3, the probability density function, f(t), tends 
toward a normal distribution, thus portraying symmetry.  β  and η  parameters are provided for 
all related system components. 
 
Table 4  FDS Design Limitations 
Limitation Maximum Value 
(per year) 
Total life cycle cost (i.e. the sum of the initial cost and total cost of 
maintenance effort) 
< 125 000 units 
Total cost of testing the system < 20 500 units 
Total cost of preventative maintenance effort < 13 500 units 
Total cost of maintenance effort (i.e. the sum of the cost of corrective 
maintenance due to repair of dormant and spurious failure, total cost of 
testing the system and total cost of preventative maintenance) 
< 44 000 units 
Acceptable number of times that a spurious system shutdown occurs < 0.75 times 
 
 
4 DESIGN LIMITATIONS 
System unavailability is certainly the most important optimization criterion for this system, 
which is required to operate on demand. However, available resources are limited and, therefore, 
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some restrictions have been placed on the potential FDS design. The summary of these 
limitations is shown in table 4. 
 
5 FDS OPTIMIZATION  
The C++ package was used to build the FDS optimization software called ISPEASSOP 
(Improved Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm Safety System Optimization Procedure). The 
program consists of three main parts. The first part is responsible for the initial population 
initialization and evaluation of each potential design life cycle cost (section 5.1). The second part 
is responsible for FDS unavailability and spurious fault tree construction for each design, their 
conversion to binary decision diagrams and calculation of the FDS unavailability and spurious 
trip frequency (section 5.2). The final part of the program is an implemented SPEA2 algorithm 
for the FDS optimization (section 5.3).  
 
5.1 ISPEASSOP Part 1 
This part of the program concentrates on the generation of the initial population and life cycle 
cost evaluation for each potential system design. 
Coding and initializing the population: The number of strings for the initial population 
for a problem is not defined, thus, based on the FDS optimization by simple GAs [2], initial 
research has used 20. Each potential system design is described by 17 parameters (section 3.2), 
where each parameter value is calculated according to the binary coding system.  
Each parameter must be allocated a particular number of bits, in order to accommodate 
the largest possible value in binary form. For example, the parameters governing the 
maintenance test interval for the deluge skid and preventative maintenance on the components of 
wear-out type, θD and θPM respectively, require 6 bits (3 bits each) of the total string to 
accommodate the maximum time span of 18 months (in three monthly intervals). In total, each 
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string representing all design variables is 43 bits in length. It can be interpreted as a set of 
concatenated integers in binary form, as shown in figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2  Binary representation of the solution string 
 
The restricted range of values assigned to each parameter does not in each case 
correspond to the representative binary range on the solution string. The total number of possible 
design options considering the allocated space for all 17 design variables is 8, 254, 927, 142, 
912. However, only 56, 435, 097, 600 of these designs correspond to feasible solutions.  For this 
reason a specialized procedure is used to code, to initialize and to check the feasibility of each 
string. In the initialization step infeasible strings are randomly regenerated. 
 Life Cycle Cost evaluation: The FDS life cycle cost is an important system optimization 
parameter due to the constraints imposed (Table 1). The important component of the life cycle 
cost is the initial cost to build the FDS (SIC). However, the system running costs must also be 
taken into account. These costs include only the maintenance activity, including the cost of 
corrective maintenance (SCMC) to repair any problem highlighted by system testing, the cost of 
preventative maintenance carried out at regular intervals on components that exhibit wear-out 
and the cost of system testing at regular intervals [2]. All these costs are evaluated over a period 
of 1 year. 
Each component has an initial purchase cost and a storage cost. The storage cost depends 
on the number of spare items stored and the cost to store each item. The corrective maintenance 
cost of each component depends on the expected number of failures and the cost to repair each 
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failure. Consider component i, the corrective maintenance of this component (CMi) can be 
calculated as: 
 
( )( )SRHRRSiDii CCCWWCM +⋅+= ,                                                                                   (3)  
 
where DiW  and 
S
iW  are the expected number of dormant and spurious failures for component i 
over the one year time period. HRR CC  ,  and SRC  denote the number of hours of manual work 
required to test the component, the cost per hour of manual work to repair failure and the cost of 
spares for each repair carried out respectively. 
The preventative maintenance is required only for the wear-out type components. The 
preventative maintenance cost per year of each component depends on the number of times 
preventative maintenance is carried out in the year and the cost per effort. The total FDS 
preventative maintenance cost (SPMC) is, therefore, calculated as the sum of the preventative 
maintenance costs (PMCi) incurred by each component i. PMCi is given by  
 
( )( )SPHPP
PM
i CCHPMC +⋅





=
θ
8760
,                                                                              (4) 
 
where θPM is converted to hours, HP is the number of hours manual work required to carry out 
preventative maintenance, CHP denotes the cost per hour of manual work to carry out 
preventative maintenance, and CSP is the cost of spares each time preventative maintenance is 
undertaken.  
 System tests are carried out on each pump line (θP), the distribution network (θR) and 
deluge skid (θD). The cost of testing must only be considered once per group of components, 
since a pump line test examines the pump and all other elements on that line simultaneously, and 
a single ringmain and deluge skid test examines all associated components. It is assumed that the 
 15 
simultaneously tested components require the same specialized labor (CHT) and the same test 
time (HT) as all other elements. Therefore, the FDS testing cost (STC) can be evaluated as: 
 
,TCDSTCRTCAPLTCFPLSTC +++=                                                                          (5) 
 
where TCFPL, TCAPL, TCR and TCDS denote the cost of testing the firewater pumps and lines, 
the cost of testing the AFFF pumps and lines, the cost of testing the ringmain and the deluge skid 
respectively. 
 The FDS total life cycle cost (LCC) is evaluated by summing all mentioned costs, i.e.  
 
STCSPMCSCMCSICLCC +++= .                                                                              (6) 
 
5.2 ISPEASSOP Part 2 
This part of the program is responsible for FDS unavailability and spurious fault trees 
construction for each design, their conversion to binary decision diagrams and calculation of the 
FDS unavailability and spurious trip frequency. 
FDS unavailability: The fault tree combined with binary decision diagrams for 
quantification have been implemented. No explicit objection function exists, as altering the 
parameters in the design continually alters the structure of the fault tree and hence the logic 
function. Therefore, each possible design alternative is obtained from a single fault tree by using 
house events. Figure 3 shows the structure of the part of the fault tree that deals with two pump 
failure (gates G5-G7 need to be further developed).  
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Fig. 3 The fault tree structure for pump option. 
 
If two electric pumps are fitted  the house event, HE2, corresponding to this condition is set to 
TRUE. In this case house events HE1 and HE0, corresponding to the ‘one electric pump fitted’ 
and ‘no electric pumps fitted’, are conversely set to FALSE. Therefore, the right-most branches 
are switched off and a contribution to the top event arises from the left-most branch only. After 
the house event reduction, each fault tree is then converted to its BDD equivalent and integrated 
within the SPEA2 source code (section 5.3).  
The top event ‘Firewater Deluge System Fails to Protect’ represents the causes of the 
firewater deluge system unavailability. There are three main reasons for the top event to occur, 
either the firewater or AFFF pump mechanisms are not activated, the AFFF pumps themselves 
fail or the water or foam deluge systems fail. The first reason, i.e. failure to initiate the firewater 
and AFFF pump mechanisms, occurs if both automatic and manual interventions fail. The 
manual start of the system fails if either the push button on the MFGP fails or if the operator fails 
to push the button. An automatic start fails if either the fire pump selector unit fails or the low 
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pressure sensing on the firewater ringmain fails. Failure of the low pressure sensing depends on 
the number of pressure transmitters fitted (N) and the number of pressure transmitters required to 
trip the system (K).  
Failure of the AFFF or water deluge skid occurs if either events ‘Failure of the water deluge 
skid’ or ‘Failure of the AFFF Deluge Skid’ occur. The possible reasons for the event ‘Failure of 
the water deluge skid’ to occur are:  the water spray isolation valves fail, the strainer nozzle 
becomes blocked or the deluge valve fails to open. Further development of the event ‘The water 
deluge valve fails to open’ involves two scenarios connected by OR logic, i.e. events that restrict 
activation of the deluge valve and failure of the deluge valve itself. ‘Failure to activate the water 
deluge valve’ can be caused by the failure of the signal to the solenoids, by the solenoid valves 
remaining energized or by the failure of the valmatic release valve.  In a similar manner the 
event ‘Failure of the AFFF deluge skid’ is developed. The fault tree consists of 618 gates, 50 
basic events and 59 house events. 
 FDS spurious trip frequency; According to the FDS system limitations a number of 
spurious system occurrences is permitted, i.e. Fsys < 0.75 (Table 1). Hence, the spurious 
activation of the FDS must be established by developing the specific fault tree to quantify causes  
of this failure mode. The top event ‘Firewater deluge system fails spuriously’ occurs if the 
solenoid valves fail spuriously, the valmatic release valve opens spuriously or the signal from the 
main fire and gas panel to the solenoid valves is interrupted. The latter event occurs as a result of 
spurious activation of the ringmain pressure sensors. 
Constant failure rates are assigned to all components from the FDS spurious trip fault tree. 
Furthermore, spurious failures are instantaneously revealed and repair initiated, hence the 
probability of failure of each basic event is independent of its associated maintenance test 
interval. Similarly to the unavailability fault tree, a single spurious trip fault tree with 
incorporated house events is formed to analyze each potential FDS design. After setting the 
house events, the resulting fault tree is converted to its BDD and the spurious s trip frequency is 
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calculated within SPEA2 source code. The fault tree consists of 61 gates, 16 basic events and 13 
house events.    
  
5.3 ISPEASSOP Part 3 
Step one of the algorithm is generation of the initial population, discussed in section 5.1. Step 
two requires fitness assignment. The FDS available resources are not inexhaustible (limitations 
are provided in table 1), therefore, penalty formulae must be derived to determine how large a 
penalty is required depending on the degree of violation of each constraint. The detailed penalty 
evaluations are given in [2]. Each penalty is subsequently added to the system unavailability to 
give the penalized system unavailability value (Q’sys) for each possible FDS design. 
Fitness assignment requires the division of the population of designs into dominated and 
nondominated groups according to the following rules: since the optimization is a minimization 
problem, the design a dominates the design b if all a parameter values are equal to or smaller 
than b parameter values and at least one of parameter a value is smaller that the respective b 
parameter value. 
The design a is nondominated if there is no design in the population which dominates a. 
To avoid the situation that designs dominated by the same archive members have identical 
fitness values, for each individual both dominating and dominated solutions are taken into 
account. In detail, each design i in the archive and the population is assigned a strength value 
)(iS , representing the number of solutions it dominates. On the basis of the S values, the raw 
fitness )(iR of a design i is calculated. This fitness is determined by the strengths of its 
dominators in both the archive and population.  
Although the raw fitness assignment provides a sort of niching mechanism based on the 
concept of Pareto dominance, it may fail when most designs do not dominate each other. Hence, 
additional information is incorporated to discriminate between designs having identical raw 
fitness values. The density estimation technique used in SPEA2 is an adaptation of the k-th 
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nearest neighbor method [5], where the density at any point is a decreasing function of the 
distance to the k-th nearest data point. In this problem the inverse of the distance to the k-th 
nearest neighbor is taken as a density estimate ijσ , i.e. for each individual i the distances to all 
designs j in the archive and population. Obtained distances are stored in a list or matrix. After 
sorting the list in increasing order, the k-th element gives the distance sought, denoted as kiσ , 
where k is equal to the square root of the population size. Afterwards, the density )(iD  
corresponding to i  is defined by 
 
                       .            .                                                                                                                  (7) 
 
In the denominator, two is added to ensure that its value is greater that zero. Finally, 
adding )(iD  to the raw fitness value )(iR of the design i yields its fitness )(iF . 
 
6 RESULTS 
 
The objective of the design optimization problem for this system was to minimize three system 
optimization parameters (unavailability, spurious trip frequency and life cycle cost) by 
manipulating the design variables such that limitations placed on them by constraints are not 
violated. Ten ISPEASSOP runs, 100 generations each, have been implemented to tailor the 
algorithm parameters for the FDS system. Each run resulted in a Pareto set of 20 potential FDS 
designs. The number of non-dominated solutions  in the Pareto front varied from 7 to 14 for 
different Pareto sets.  Table 5 and 6 show the best FDS designs obtained after each run of 
ISPEASSOP. The best design was determined to be that with the largest number of smallest 
objectives.  
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Table 5 Best design variables after 10 runs of ISPEASSOP 
Run Number Design  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
K / N 4/4 3/3 3/3 4/4 3/3 4/4 3/3 2/2 3/3 3/3 
P type2 type2 type1 type3 type3 type1 type1 type1 type3 type2 
                     
Firewater Supply and Distribution System 
 
FE / F 3/5 2/4 1/1 2/3 1/1 1/1 1/1 3/4 2/6 3/6 
FP 33.3% 50% 100% 33.3% 100% 100% 100% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
FT type2 type1 type1 type2 type2 type1 type1 type1 type2 type2 
                       
AFFF Supply and Distribution System 
 
AE / A 1/1 2/2 1/1 2/4 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/1 1/1 1/1 
AP 100% 50% 100% 50% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
                
 Valve and Material Types 
 
W 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 
D 2 2 1 1 3 3 1 2 1 1 
C old old new old new old new new old old 
                   
 Maintenance Intervals 
 
θP 27 22 27 20 17 12 28 21 23 28 
θR 5 1 21 21 19 18 24 18 22 20 
θD 3 18 6 15 18 18 15 18 9 6 
θPM 12 9 6 18 9 9 9 12 12 15 
 
Table 6 Optimization parameter values for table 5 
Run 
Number 
LCC SCMC SPMC STC Fsys Qsys Q’sys 
1 108641.00 20087.42 10290.97 8012.62 0.199976 0.008115 0.008115 
2 119084.40 23113.32 12775.00 11346.08 0.200262 0.008181 0.008181 
3 73389.63 18378.17 9672.50 4288.96 0.199977 0.008076 0.008076 
4 122542.10 26101.96 7279.72 11110.40 0.200370 0.008181 0.008181 
5 102773.80 36759.24 9571.11 7893.46 0.200540 0.008076 0.008076 
6 105601.30 36759.24 9571.11 11120.91 0.200812 0.008076 0.008076 
7 100919.40 36759.00 9571.11 4839.29 0.199929 0.008127 0.008127 
8 101027.70 20315.44 8648.47 8513.77 0.200528 0.008149 0.008149 
9 120858.20 21966.59 11832.08 9709.51 0.200228 0.008142 0.008142 
10 122715.00 27214.55 9490.00 8060.42 0.199936 0.008029 0.008029 
 
It can be noticed from table 6 that unavailability values for best designs of all ten runs are 
very close, however the smallest unavailability (Q’sys = 8.029e-3) has been obtained in the last 
run. The third run of the program resulted in the system design with the smallest life cycle cost 
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(LCC = 73389.63 units). The smallest system spurious trip frequency has been obtained in 7th run 
(Fsys = 0.199929 times per year).  
Table 5 shows that the majority of the designs have 3 pressure transmitters fitted and 
required to trip the system (N and K). The pressure transmitter type (P) varies. The firewater 
supply and distribution system usually consists of 1 or 4 pumps (F) of different type (FT). 
33.33% and 100% pump capacities (FP) dominate. The AFFF supply and distribution system has 
1-2 pumps (A) with 100% capacity (AP). The difference between valve and material types (W, D 
and C) has insignificant effect on the design parameter values. For the majority of the designs the 
values of the maintenance test interval for the firewater and AFFF systems (θP) are in the range 
from 20 to 28 days. The maintenance test interval for the ringmain (θR) is usually higher than 20 
weeks. On the other hand, values of the test interval for the deluge skid and preventative 
maintenance on components of wear-out type are in the interval [15, 18] and [9, 12] months 
respectively. 
To establish the performance of the multi-objective approach these results are compared 
with those using a simple GA [2]. From the simple GA results the best design was determined as 
the one with the smallest unavailability. From the SPEA2 (ISPEASSOP program) the best design 
was determined to be that with the largest number of smallest objectives. Tables 7 and 8 provide 
the comparison of these best  designs.  
Tables 5-8 and show that all designs produced by ISPEASSOP  have smaller 
unavailability and spurious trip frequency than the ones obtained by using the simple genetic 
algorithm. Designs 1-3 and 5-8 have also smaller life cycle cost. Using a simple GA sufficient 
genetic diversity among solutions in the population should be guaranteed. The relatively small 
initial population and small number of generations resulted in lack of such diversity and, 
therefore,  better performance is produced by the SPEA2 method,  due to its advanced feature 
(the archive) the algorithm doesn’t loose valuable solutions during the search process. It might 
be expected that a significant increase in the number of generations or a larger initial population 
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may make the simple GA produce better results than the SPEA2. However, another important 
advantage of the SPEA2 is that it finds optimal solutions faster, which is very important for large 
safety systems in terms of limited computer resources. One run of the simple GA takes several 
hours, on the other hand one run of the SPEA2 takes only 12 minutes. In addition, the SPEA2 
allows minimization of more than one objective. 
 
Table 7  Best FDS designs obtained by simple GA and SPEA2 
 
Design 
Variables 
GASSOP  
(GAs) 
ISPEASSOP 
(SPEA2) 
K / N 1 / 3 3 / 3 
P type 1  type 2 
Firewater Supply and Distribution System 
FE / F 3 / 6 3 / 6 
FP 50% 33.3% 
FT type 2 type 2 
 AFFF Supply and Distribution System 
AE / A 1 / 2 1 / 1 
AP 100% 100% 
Valve and Material Types 
W 3 2  
D 3 1  
C new old 
 Maintenance Intervals 
θP 18 28 
θR 1 20 
θD 3 6 
θPM 18 15 
 
 
 
Table 8 Optimization parameter values for table 7 
 
Optimization 
Parameters 
GASSOP 
(GAs) 
ISPEASSOP 
(SPEA2) 
STC 8759.30 8060.42 
SPMC 11123.80 9490.00 
SCMC 29640.70 27214.55 
LCC 120386.00 122715.00 
Fsys 0.403000 0.199936 Qsys 1.263e-2 8.029e-3 Q /sys 1.263e-2 8.029e-3 
  
100 generations of the algorithm explores approximately 3000 feasible possible system 
designs, which is a very small number compared to the total number of feasible designs (i.e., 56, 
435, 097, 600). To test the performance of the developed technique further it was decided to 
increase the number of generations from 100 to 1500, which would explore more than 31000 
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potential system designs.  The population of the 10th run has been chosen for this experiment 
since it produced the design with smaller system unavailability and spurious trip frequency 
compared to those obtained by the other runs. Figure 4 shows the comparison between Pareto 
fronts obtained after 100 and 1500 generations of the same initial population. The same fronts in 
two dimensional space are shown in Figure 5(a-c).    
 
Fig. 4 Comparison of the Pareto fronts obtained after 100 and 1500 generations of the 10th run of 
the ISPEASSOP  
 
a) Life cycle cost and spurious trip frequency 
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b) Life cycle cost and system unavailability 
 
c) Spurious trip frequency and system unavailability 
Fig. 5  Pareto front from figure 4 in a two dimensional space  
 
Figure 4 shows that after 1500 generations several non-dominated solutions were added to the 
Pareto front, which are situated in the middle of the curve and, therefore, have provided balance 
between all optimization parameter values (i.e. all components are equally far from their global 
minimums). However, it can be seen from figure 5 that designs with minimal values of all 
optimization parameters have been found within the first 100 generations. Therefore, additional 
generations do not improve significantly the performance of the developed optimization 
technique. Additionally it can be noticed from figure 5 that an increase of system life cycle cost 
 25 
results in a decrease of system unavailability and spurious trip frequency (Fig. 5a and 5b). On 
the other hand, system unavailability and spurious trip frequency are directly proportional (Fig. 
5c). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
An automated robust design optimization process has been developed. The adequacy of the 
system performance in terms of unavailability calculation is assessed using fault tree analysis 
techniques. The causes of failure for each possible design alternative of a safety system is 
represented by a single fault tree by using house events. The use of the BDD technique allows 
the solution of the fault tree in the most efficient manner. 
 The developed tool has been successfully applied to the firewater deluge system, and 
produced good results for system design optimization. The SPEA2 produces improved results 
compared to those obtained by simple GAs. Another important advantage of the implemented 
technique is that it is faster and requires less memory resources. The performance of the 
developed technique in terms of limited computer resources has been tested by increasing the 
number of generations. However, this experiment improved the results only marginally. 
It was assumed that the FDS consists of independent components. However, in reality 
one component failure may affect one or more other components. Therefore, the future work will 
be concentrated on testing the effectiveness of the technique on systems with dependencies. 
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APPENDIX 
Notation  
AFFF  aqueous film-forming foam 
BDD  binary decision diagram 
CHP  Cost per hour of manual work to carry out preventative maintenance 
CHR  Cost per hour of manual work to repair failure (dormant or spurious) 
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CR  Number of hours manual work required to repair the component 
CSP  Cost of spares each time preventative maintenance is undertaken 
CSR  Cost of spares for each repair carried out (dormant or spurious) 
FDS   firewater deluge system 
Fsys   spurious trip frequency 
GAs   genetic algorithms 
HP  Number of hours manual work required to carry out preventative maintenance 
LCC  life cycle cost 
MOGA a multi-objective genetic algorithm 
Qsys   system unavailability 
Q’sys  penalized system unavailability 
SCMC  system corrective maintenance cost 
SIC  system initial cost 
SPEA2  improved strength Pareto evolutionary approach 
SPMC  system preventative maintenance cost 
STC  system testing cost 
